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Abstract 
Previous literature finds that consumers tend to undervalue discounted future energy costs in their 
purchase decisions for energy-using durables. We argue that this finding could result from ignoring 
consumer heterogeneity in empirical analyses as opposed to true undervaluation. In the context of 
automobile demand, we show that, if not accounted for, consumer heterogeneity could lead to sorting, 
which in turn biases toward zero the estimate of marginal willingness to pay for discounted future fuel 
costs. 
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Is There an Energy Paradox in Fuel Economy? A Note on the Role 
of Consumer Heterogeneity and Sorting Bias 
Antonio M. Bento, Shanjun Li, and Kevin Roth∗ 
1. Introduction 
Although economic theory suggests that rational consumers should be willing to pay 
$1.00 more for a vehicle that saves them $1.00 in discounted future fuel costs, a growing body of 
literature finds a marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for reduced discounted future fuel costs 
ranging from $0.35 to $0.79 (Helfand and Wolverton 2010; Greene 2010). This perceived 
undervaluation of future fuel costs is an example of energy paradox in the automobile market. 
The energy paradox concept is used to understand the unexpectedly slow diffusion of apparently 
cost-effective, energy-efficient technologies that involve similar trade-offs between up-front 
capital costs and future operating costs (Jaffe and Stavins 1994). The energy paradox has also 
been studied in the context of other energy-using durables (Hausman 1979). 
With increasing concerns related to climate change, energy security, and local pollution, 
policies to promote energy efficiency in various sectors of the economy are subject to increased 
attention from policymakers. In the automobile sector, the debate over such policies focuses on 
the comparison between the gasoline tax and corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards, 
as well as the design of future CAFE standards. Precise estimates of the MWTP for reduced 
discounted future fuel costs are central to this debate (Parry et al. 2010). If consumers correctly 
value future fuel costs, gasoline taxes are found to be less costly than CAFE standards in 
achieving targeted fuel reductions (Fischer et al. 2007; Jacobsen 2010). However, the opposite is 
true if consumer undervaluation is sufficiently large. 
Is there really an energy paradox in fuel economy? Our concern is that prior literature has 
answered this question by relying on hedonic and discrete choice models that ignore the 
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underlying consumer heterogeneity in MWTP for future reductions in fuel costs. If consumers 
are heterogeneous in their MWTP, they will sort into vehicles based on vehicle fuel efficiency: 
those with high MWTP for reduced fuel costs will sort into fuel-efficient vehicles and those with 
low MWTP will sort into fuel-inefficient ones. In a (multinomial) logit specification of vehicle 
demand, this will imply that a portion of the utility that is captured in the error term will be 
positively correlated with the vehicle’s fuel costs. As a consequence, the estimate of MWTP for 
future fuel costs will be biased toward zero, suggesting undervaluation. Although we are not 
arguing that there is no undervaluation of fuel economy, our point is that an empirical analysis 
that ignores consumer heterogeneity may overstate the magnitude of undervaluation. Similar 
concerns of bias due to sorting were raised in a recent study of the value of a statistical life using 
labor market data (Deleire et al. 2009). 
We illustrate this point by comparing the estimated MWTP for future reductions in fuel 
costs from a logit model and a random coefficients logit model using data generated from an 
equilibrium model of the automobile market.1 Our analysis shows that, when undervaluation of 
fuel costs is not present in the data-generating mechanism, the logit model could erroneously 
suggest significant undervaluation, whereas the random coefficients logit model recovers the true 
average MWTP. 
2. Methods 
2.1 The Equilibrium Model 
The equilibrium model for data generation is composed of a demand side and a supply 
side.  
Demand: On the demand side, each consumer chooses to buy a new vehicle, from among 
J models or products, or not to make any purchase (labeled choosing the outside good) in a given 
period. The utility of consumer i from vehicle j is defined as 
ij i j i ij i j ij upf c x α βγ ε = ++ +                                              (1) 
                                                 
1Given that consumers have multiple vehicle models from which to choose, the empirical methods are multinomial 
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where  i α ,  i β , and  i γ are individual-specific taste parameters. We define  { , , }. ii i θ αβγ = j p  is 
price of model j.  ij fc is the present value of the total expected discounted fuel cost of the vehicle; 
it is defined by 





ij i itj it j
t
fc AVMT gp MPG δ
=
=∑                                             (2) 
where  j T  is the expected lifetime of vehicle model j,  i δ is an individual-specific discount factor, 
itj AVMT is annual vehicle miles of travel in year t (which usually decreases with the vehicle’s 
age), and 
e
it gp is the expected gasoline price at year t of consumer i. Heterogeneity can arise 
from any of the elements used to calculate the lifetime fuel cost of the vehicle.  j x is a vector of 
other vehicle attributes, and  ij ε is assumed to have a type I extreme value distribution. We 
normalize the utility from the outside good, 0 i u , to zero. The probability of household i choosing 
vehicle j is given by 
 
exp( )










                                                           (3) 
where  ij ij ij uuε =−. Given individual choice probabilities, the aggregate demand can be obtained 
through summation. 
Supply: The supply side is composed of several firms, each producing multiple vehicle 
models. They engage in Bertrand competition in that each firm chooses prices to maximize its 
total profit in a given year, taking the products available as fixed. Following the literature, we 
assume that the marginal cost of each product is constant. The total profit of firm f is 




pm c q p π θ
∈
=− ∑                                                  (4) 
where F is the set of all products produced by firm f, mcj is the marginal cost, and qj is the 
aggregate demand. p is the price vector; the equilibrium price vector is obtained through the first-
order conditions  
1 (,) pm c q p θ
− =+ Δ                                                       (5) 
where the element of Δ, jr Δ is zero if j and r are produced by different firms. Otherwise, it is 
equal to  rj qp −∂ ∂ . Given the demand function and marginal cost, this equation can be used to 
compute equilibrium prices and sales. Resources for the Future  Bento, Li, and Roth 
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2.2. Data Generation 
Through our data generation approach, we aim to mimic the U.S. auto market. Vehicle 
information comes from the 2001 Ward’s Automotive Yearbook; vehicle characteristics include 
miles per gallon (MPG), horsepower, weight, and manufacturer. We construct marginal cost, a 
function of MPG, horsepower, and weight, for each model based on estimates from Berry et al. 
(1996).2 We randomly choose a set of vehicle models (25 in the baseline simulation) and assume 
that these models are available in each year from 2001 to 2006, the time span for our analysis. 
For ease of exposition, we make several demand-side assumptions. For preference 
parameters, we assume that all consumers have the same preference on all characteristics except 
fuel costs. In calculating fuel costs, we assume that the discount factor  , δ annual vehicle miles of 
travel , AVMT and expected gasoline price 
e gp are all constant across consumers for any given 
vehicle. We assume a 10 percent yearly discount rate. Vehicle lifetime and age-specific annual 
miles of travel for passenger cars and light trucks are from Lu (2006). We further assume that 
expected gasoline prices during a vehicle’s lifetime are equal to current annual gasoline price 
(i.e., gasoline price follows a random walk). Annual gasoline prices during 2001–2006 are from 
the Energy Information Administration. These simplifying assumptions, innocuous for our 
conclusion, imply that consumer heterogeneity is manifested only through the consumer-specific 
taste parameter on fuel cost,  i β . In the baseline simulation, we assume that  i β  has a uniform 
distribution; the range of the distribution affects the degree of consumer heterogeneity.  
We generate data in two steps. First, we generate equilibrium prices for each model, 
assuming the whole market with 50,000 consumers in each year. Second, based on equilibrium 
prices, we generate vehicle choices for 20,000 consumers in each year.  
2.3 Estimation 
The goal of the estimation is to recover the underlying preference parameters and to 
obtain consumers’ MWTP for reduced fuel costs. For ease of exposition, we assume that the 
econometrician observes all vehicle characteristics relevant to consumers.3 We employ two 
methods: a logit model and a random coefficients logit model. The logit model is estimated using 
                                                 
2 We also add a random error term to the marginal cost of each attribute and to the marginal cost of each product 
based on the standard errors estimated by Berry et al. (1996). All costs are converted to 2001 dollars. 
3 In real applications, it is important to control for unobserved product attributes. Most recent literature on 
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the standard maximum likelihood method. As discussed in Train (2003), the appeal of the 
random coefficients model comes from its ability to incorporate unobserved consumer 
heterogeneity, which in our context avoids sorting bias. This model is estimated using the 
simulated maximum likelihood method. To conduct numerical integration in the simulated 
method, we employ Halton sequences, which are more efficient than direct Monte Carlo 
sampling.  
3. Results 
We find three main results from the Monte Carlo analysis. 
Result 1: In the presence of heterogeneity, the logit model suggests undervaluation of the 
MWTP for reduced future fuel costs, even when undervaluation is not present in the data. 
Support: Panel A in Table 1 shows that consumers undervalue fuel costs by 29 percent. 
The parameter estimates on vehicle price and fuel cost implies that consumers are only willing to 
pay $0.71 for a $1.00 reduction in discounted future fuel costs. The bias comes from individuals 
sorting into vehicles based on their MWTP: those very averse to fuel costs (e.g., with very 
negative MWTP) purchase vehicles with low fuel costs. The correlation between fuel cost and 
the average MWTP among consumers who purchase corresponding vehicles is depicted on the 
left panel of Figure 1 (the correlation coefficient is 0.83). The correlation implies that the error 
term in the logit model will be positively correlated with fuel cost, biasing the MWTP estimate 
toward zero. We believe that at least part of the undervaluation found in prior literature could be 
attributable to this type of sorting bias. 
Result 2: The random coefficients logit model correctly identifies the MWTP. 
Support: Table 1, Panel A shows that, by explicitly modeling consumer heterogeneity, 
the random coefficients logit model is able to recover the underlying parameters on vehicle price 
and fuel cost. The implied MWTP is –1, indicating that consumers are willing to pay $1.00 for a 
$1.00 reduction in discounted future fuel costs.  
Result 3: The greater the heterogeneity, the larger the bias from the logit model.  
Support: The underlying data-generating process in Panel A of Table 1 implies twice the 
heterogeneity of Panel B. As a consequence, the undervaluation for the logit model in Panel A, 
29 percent, is larger than the 10 percent undervaluation in Panel B.  
Table 2 presents Monte Carlo results for alternative specifications. Panel A suggests that 
increased market power magnifies the bias from the logit model, with the undervaluation going 
to 37 percent from 29 percent in the baseline model in Table 1. Increasing the number of vehicle 
draws (Table 2, Panel B) slightly decreases the undervaluation from 29 percent to 27 percent. Resources for the Future  Bento, Li, and Roth 
6 
The three findings discussed above still hold when the distribution of MWTP takes a log-normal 
distribution (Table 2, Panel C). 
 
Figure 1. Fuel Cost and Average Marginal Willingness to Pay among Buyers 
 
Notes: Figure 1 plots the average MWTP for reduced future fuel cost among consumers who purchase vehicles with 
a given fuel cost. Fuel cost is the lifetime discounted fuel cost divided by 10,000. The left figure corresponds to 
Panel A in Table 1 and the right figure to Panel B. 















































































MWTP: Uniform[-1.5, -1]Resources for the Future  Bento, Li, and Roth 
7 
Table 1. Monte Carlo Results 
   True  Estimates 
Panel A: baseline model  Logit  Random coef logit
Para S.E.  Para  S.E.
Constant  1  0.60 0.05  1.05  0.07
Price  –2  –2.02 0.01  –2.00  0.01
Fuel cost  –2  –1.43 0.03  –2.01  0.07
Weight  4  4.49 0.15  3.83  0.17
Horsepower  8  7.68 0.14  8.18  0.15
Sigma
a  4  4.18  0.26
Log-likelihood  228,335 228,268 
Implied valuation for $1 drop in fuel cost $0.71 $1.00 
Implied undervaluation  29%
Panel B: smaller heterogeneity  Logit  Random coef logit
Para S.E.  Para  S.E.
Constant  1  0.93 0.05  1.08  0.06
Price  –2  –2.01 0.01  –2.01  0.01
Fuel cost  –2  –1.82 0.03  –2.03  0.06
Weight  4  3.99 0.15  3.80  0.16
Horsepower  8  8.05 0.14  8.21  0.14
Sigma
a  2  2.31  0.31
Log-likelihood  225,942 225,933 
Implied valuation for $1 drop in fuel cost $0.90 $1.01 
Implied undervaluation  10%
a Sigma measures the degree of heterogeneity for MWTP for fuel cost. The value of sigma is multiplied by random 
draws from a uniform distribution [–0.5, 0.5]. In Panel A, the range of the MWTP for fuel cost is [–2, 0], whereas in 
Panel B it is [–1.5, –0.5]. Resources for the Future  Bento, Li, and Roth 
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Table 2. Robustness Checks 
   True  Estimates 
Panel A: monopoly instead of oligopoly     Logit  Random coef logit 
      Para S.E.  Para  S.E.
Constant  1  0.62 0.06  1.10  0.09
Price  –2  –2.02 0.02  –2.01  0.02
Fuel cost  –2  –1.27 0.03  –2.14  0.14
Weight  4  4.38 0.19  3.80  0.21
Horsepower  8  7.86 0.18  8.32  0.19
Sigma  4        4.55  0.42
Log-likelihood     158,480   158,437 
Implied valuation for $1 drop in fuel cost     $0.63    $1.07   
Implied undervaluation     37%        
Panel B: 50 vehicle models instead of 25     Logit  Random coef logit 
      Para S.E.  Para  S.E.
Constant  1  0.62 0.03  1.00  0.05
Price  –2  –2.02 0.01  –2.00  0.01
Fuel cost  –2  –1.48 0.03  –1.99  0.06
Weight  4  4.18 0.12  3.99  0.13
Horsepower  8  7.75 0.11  8.01  0.11
Sigma  4        4.01  0.21
Log-likelihood     326,436   326,351   
Implied valuation for $1 drop in fuel cost     $0.73    $1.01  $0.99 
Implied undervaluation     27%        
Panel C: lognormal MWTP instead     Logit  Random coef logit 
 of uniform distribution     Para S.E.  Para  S.E.
Constant  1  0.74 0.07  0.94  0.10
Price  –2  –2.01 0.02  –2.00  0.02
Fuel cost     –1.65 0.04  N/A   
Weight  4  4.38 0.21  4.21  0.21
Horsepower  8  7.78 0.19  7.96  0.20
Mean of underlying normal distribution  0.57        0.59  0.05
Sigma of underlying normal distribution  0.50        0.45  0.09
Implied mean of the lognormal distribution  2        –2.01   
Log-likelihood  113,980   113,976 
Implied valuation for $1 drop in fuel cost     $0.82    $1.00   
Implied undervaluation     18%        Resources for the Future  Bento, Li, and Roth 
9 
 
4. Conclusion  
Our analysis shows that, if not accounted for, unobserved consumer heterogeneity can 
significantly affect the estimated MWTP for discounted future fuel costs. We believe that this 
may partly explain consumer undervaluation of future fuel costs and the wide range of estimates 
found in the literature. To properly evaluate the existence and magnitude of the energy paradox, 
further econometric analysis that explicitly models consumer heterogeneity, such as random 
coefficient models in either a discrete choice or hedonic framework (e.g., Berry et al. 1995; 
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